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Introduction
Corporations, where free to exercise unfettered power in furtherance
of narrow economic interests, should be held accountable to internation-
ally agreed upon norms of human rights. This normative vision contrasts
sharply with current reality. A constellation of institutional, political, and
historical forces have thus far inhibited the emergence of an international
human rights legal framework that can bind corporate entities. Instead,
the principal response to revelations of serious human rights abuses result-
ing from corporate activity 2 has been the promulgation of various volun-
tary regimes by international institutions, governments, and corporations
themselves. 3 Although these are promising first steps, non-binding initia-
tives alone are unlikely to satisfy the evolving demand for corporate
accountability arising from vocal sectors of civil society, the human rights
community, academia, shareholders, and the public at large.4
This paper sets out to bridge the legitimacy gap between ineffective
voluntary mechanisms and prospective, albeit currently unfeasible, com-
pulsory regimes by presenting a model for a human rights impact assess-
ment (HRIA) in the overseas hydrocarbon industry, an industry plagued by
allegations of human rights abuse. 5 Part I sets out the background of our
2. The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre website contains a continu-
ously updated compendium of documented allegations and rebuttals of corporate
human rights abuses. See Business and Human Rights Resource Center, http://www.
business-humanrights.org.
3. See generally INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES
(2002), available at http://www.ichrp.org/paper-files/107-p_01.pdf [hereinafter
BEYOND VOLUNTARISM]; David Kinley &Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence
of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
931, 935 (2004).
4. See, e.g., BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 3, at 7; Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 3,
at 1021-22; ViLjAM ENGSTROM, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLA-
TIONS?, http://www.abo.fi/instut/imr/norfa/ville.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005); Devel-
opments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HFAv. L. REV. 1943, 2025 (2001);
Robert McCorquodale, Globalization and Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 735, 763
(1999).
5. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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case study: the billion-dollar Yadana Pipeline Project in Burma (Myanmar),
the first large international pipeline in Southeast Asia.6 The Paper then
canvasses the relationship between human rights and private extractive
industries and describes the need for human rights concepts, as well as
attention to environmental concerns and corruption, within the corporate
"sphere of influence" 
-typically its core operations, business partnerships,
host communities, and relations with policy-makers. 7 Part 2 assesses the
limitations of extant mechanisms, such as voluntary codes of conduct, in
regulating corporate human rights compliance, and introduces the HRIA as
a stepping stone to more effective regulation. Part 3 outlines the basic his-
tory, principles, and processes of environmental and social impact assess-
ment regimes with a view towards developing a model for an HRIA. Part 4
presents the conceptual, legal, and business case for such an HRIA. Part 5
applies this model to the case study and then concludes with several gen-
eral comments and specific recommendations for creating a viable HRIA
regime.
1. Human Rights at the Bottom of the Barrel
Forced relocation, forced labor, rape, torture and murder: these were
the charges that Burmese peasants brought against the U.S. oil company,
Unocal, in 1996. 8 Burma's Yadana gas field, located in the Andaman Sea
about 60 kilometers off Burma's southwest coast, was developed in 1992
under a conventional "production sharing" contract between Unocal
(28.26%), TotalFinaElf, the project operator (31.24%), the state-owned oil
companies of Thailand (PTT-EP) (25.50%), and Burma (MOGE) (15%). 9
The human rights abuses discussed here occurred along the 65-kilometer
onshore Burmese section of the $1 billion pipeline constructed in 1998 to
carry the gas 649 kilometers across Burma into Thailand.' 0 The victims
filed suit in U.S. federal and California state courts under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA) 11 and state law, respectively, after allegedly suffering
abuses at the hands of Burmese army units, who were hired by the consor-
6. Jeff Moore, Unocal's Stake in Southeast Asia, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Jul. 20, 2005,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast-Asia/GG20Ae03.html.
7. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE & OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, EMBEDDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN BUSINESS PRACTICE, 17-18 (2004), available
at http://www.unglobalcompact. org/docs/issues-doc/humanrights/embedding. pdf
[hereinafter EMBEDDING HUMAN RIGHTS]. This recent joint publication of the U.N. Global
Compact and High Commissioner for Human Rights offices is an ambitious step in the
promotion of human rights through business. Although it is seen only as educational
material, it offers practical meaning on the Global Compact principles for companies by
presenting four case studies and a policy report on business practice in different indus-
tries. The Global Compact will be further discussed below.
8. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see Complaint, Doe v.
Unocal Corp., No. 96-CV-06959 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 3, 1996) [hereinafter Doe-Unocal
Complaint].
9. UNION OF MYANMAR, MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, COUNTRY REPORT FOR MYANMAR 8,
available at http://www.petronas.com.my/intranet/ascope/ascope.nsf/3b269571clOe71
e5482568960033edc8/d9b2645688f00ced48256b0500145 1fl/$FILE/Myanmar.pdf.
10. Id.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
Cornell International Law Journal
tium to secure the Yadana pipeline route. 1 2 In 1997, the District Court
ruled, for the first time in U.S. legal history, that a corporation and its
executive officers could be held liable under the ATCA for violations of
international human rights norms in foreign countries, and that U.S.
courts have the authority to adjudicate such claims. 13 An out-of-court set-
tlement was reached in December 2004, on the eve of an en banc hearing of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after the court had established that
Unocal knew that the military had a record of committing human rights
abuses; that the Project hired the military to provide security for the Project,
a military that forced villagers to work and entire villages to relocate for the
benefit of the Project; that the military, while forcing villagers to work and
relocate, committed numerous acts of violence; and that Unocal knew or
should have known that the military did commit, was committing and
would continue to commit these tortious acts.
1 4
According to Donal O'Neill, a retired senior employee of the Royal
Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, "[blusiness changes the environment it
operates in. The issue concerns every commercial undertaking from the
corner store to the major production plant, yet in none is it as dramatic as
in relation to the extractive industries - mining, oil and gas."' 5
Corporate liability for human rights violations resulting from hydro-
carbon projects may be rare, but the kind of factual findings in Doe v.
Unocal, Inc. are all too common. Although multinational corporations
commonly speak of corporate social responsibility, 16 the rhetoric rings
hollow for the victims of human rights abuses from Ecuador to Chad.
1 7
12. Id.; Moore, supra note 6.
13. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, affd in part rev'd in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir.
2002).
14. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d. at 956.
15. Donal O'Neill, Impact Assessments: Preventing Slow-Burn Issues from Bursting into
Flames, 2 COMPACT Q. (2005), available at http://www.enewsbuilder.net/globalcom-
pact/earticle000375801 .cfm.
16. See, e.g., Chevron's Social Responsibility, http://www.chevron.com/social
responsibility.
17. Consider, for example, the 1971-1992 Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline Project led by
Texaco (now ChevronTexaco). See pages 2-5 of the complaint that initiated the Novem-
ber 1993 lawsuit against Texaco, Aquinda v. Texaco Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), available at http://www.texacorainforest.com/case/index.htm. For information
regarding ChevronTexaco and Halliburton's projects in Angola, see France's Ministry of
Finance Summary Report, Evaluation of Angolan Petroleum Sector, http://www.angola.
org/referenc/reports/oil diagnostic -eng.pdf; Some Transparency, No Accountability: The
Use of Oil Revenue in Angola and Its Impact on Human Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Vol. 16,
No. I(A), Jan. 2004, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angolaO04/angola
0104.pdf. For project details of ExxonMobil's hydrocarbon project in Chad, see The
World Bank Group, The Chad Cameroon Petroleum and Development Project: Project Over-
view, 10 April 2003, available at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/pro-
overview.htm. For information regarding ExxonMobil's project in Indonesia, see Com-
plaint, Doe v. ExxonMobil, No. 01-CV-01357 (D.C. Cir. filedJun. 19, 2001) [hereinafter
Doe-ExxonMobil Complaint]. To consider accusations against Shell, see Complaint,
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading Company, P.L.C., No.
96-CV-8386 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 8, 1996), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/
corporate-accountability/corporateAr ticle.asp?ObjID=SReYTC 75tj&Content=46. For
information regarding the Talisman Energy project in Sudan, see Presbyterian Church of
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Human rights violations commonly associated with the hydrocarbon
industry can be divided into four distinct yet overlapping categories. First,
before project construction can commence, developers and their govern-
ment partners often force indigenous populations to relocate (e.g., Burma,
Ecuador, and Chad-Cameroon). 18 Resettlement is rarely accompanied by
meaningful and adequate compensation, leaving populations in villages
that lack basic infrastructure (e.g., Burma and Chad-Cameroon). 19 As was
the case in Burma, local inhabitants are often subjected to abuse by the
security forces employed to guard the project facilities. 20 Second, when
commercial production begins, a substantial new source of revenue serves
to legitimize and empower autocratic and unstable regimes with shameless
histories of human rights abuses (e.g., Burma and Chad-Cameroon). 2 1
Such regimes frequently misappropriate massive project revenues rather
than meet the legitimate needs of their populations.2 2 Third, once
resource extraction and transport has commenced, adverse health issues
Sudan et al. v. Talisman Energy Inc. and the Republic of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). Allegations also arose against ExxonMobil in Ache for human rights
abuses perpetrated by Exxon security guards. See Doe-ExxonMobil Complaint. The
recent World Bank-sponsored Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Main Export Pipeline has also
come under criticism as the Host Government Agreement entered into by Turkey and
the consortium of participating oil companies requires the former to compensate the
government for any laws that "will disturb the economic equilibrium of the project[,]
chilling... Turkey's ability to improve its general human rights record." AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE LINE: THE BAKU-TBILISI-CEYHAN PIPELINE PROJECT 5
(2003), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/business/humanrightsonthelinepdf;
Paul Brown, Human Rights Row Over BP Plan to Lay Turkish Pipeline, THE GUARDIAN, Aug.
31, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/oil/story/0,11319,783937,00.html.
Although British Petroleum (BP) has just been granted approval to begin a gas pipeline
project in West Papua on the island of New Guinea, there is growing concern that this
project will result in massive human rights violations. See George Monbiot, In Bed with
the Killers, THE GUARDIAN, May 3, 2005, available at http://www.monbiot.com/archives/
2005/05/03/in-bed-with-the-killers.
18. See Monbiot, supra note 17.
19. Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the World Bank Standards To The
Oil Industry, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 77 (2002).
20. See, e.g., Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 884 (outlining the abuses which the State
Law and Order Restoration Council levied against locals in Burma when the group was
hired to provide labor and security for the Yadana pipeline project); see also Manbiot,
supra note 17.
21. See Uriz, supra note 19.
22. For example, over the course of the projected twenty-five year pipeline project,
beginning July 2003, Chad will receive estimated revenues of $US 1.8 billion (based on
projected production levels of 917 million barrels averaging $15.25 a barrel). See Martin
Plaut, Chad Hopes for Oil Wealth, BBC WORLD SERVICE AFRICA, Oct. 3, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3161216.stm. To date, however, Chad remains one
of the five most impoverished countries according to the United Nations 2002 Human
Development Index. Id. Although an Oil Revenues Control and Monitoring Board was
created to oversee the allocation of revenue, the Chadian government used a $25 million
"welcome" bonus to refurbish the ministers' offices and purchase arms and other mili-
tary equipment to fight rebel groups. Chad's New Oil Bonanza Buys Guns, Not Schools,
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
main.jhtml?xml=/News/2003/10/11/wchadl1.xml. Chad also ranked last in Trans-
parency International's 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.transparency.
org/policy-research/surveysjindices/cpi/2005.
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commonly arise from environmental pollution. 23 Toxic leaks, gas flares,
and dumping have created public health catastrophes in villages, contami-
nating vital food and drinking sources and causing cancerous tumors. 24
This amalgam of impacts stems from sudden, drastic changes in the local
economy-commonly referred to as boomtown effects or "Dutch Dis-
ease"2 5 -as the project gets underway. The costs of domestic goods and
services rise sharply, HIV/AIDS follows on the tails of flourishing drug
markets and prostitution, and labor is drawn away from traditional public
and private sectors such as education and subsistence agriculture.2 6 Once
the project matures, economic activity and labor demand plateau or
decline, leaving dependent workers in an under-diversified economy. 2 7
The relationship between communities in the developing world and the
hydrocarbon industry can be complex and devastating. To protect the citi-
zens of these countries, to promote long-term sustainable development,
and to legitimize corporate-led globalization, we must apply human rights
concepts to these business projects.
II. Whose Business is Human Rights Compliance?
Out of the ashes of World War II emerged a law of international
human rights designed to protect the dignity of the individual from arbi-
trary abuse at the hands of the state.28 However, where non-state actors
were in violation of human rights, unless their crimes put them in a class
with those tried at Nuremberg, non-state actors could not be held liable.29
As the underwriters of the cornerstone human rights treaties, states
assumed primary responsibility for the realization of human rights. 30
Consequently, human rights law largely relies upon implementation by
domestic legislatures and courts, while the regulation of corporations-tra-
ditionally not viewed as legal subjects in international law-remains the
23. ChevronTexaco's operation in Ecuador dumped approximately 4.3 million gal-
lons of toxic wastewater into the Ecuadorian rainforest per day. MIGUEL SAN SEBASTIAN &
JUAN CORDOBA ANTONIO, YANA CURl REPORT: THE IMPACT OF OIL DEVELOPMENT ON THE
HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE OF THE ECUADORIAN AMAZON (1999), http://www.amazonwatch.
org/amazon/EC/toxico/downloads/yanacuri eng.pdf.
24. See generally id.
25. The term "Dutch Disease" originated during the 1960s in reference to the natu-
ral gas discoveries in the North Sea which led to an appreciation of Dutch real exchange
rates and subsequent adverse effects on Dutch manufacturing. See W.M. Corden, Boom-
ing Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation, OXFORD ECONOMIC
PAPERS 16 (1984).
26. See PLATFORM RESEARCH, PUMPING POVERTY: BRITAIN'S DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE OIL INDUSTRY, http://www.bankwatch.org/documents/
Pumping-poverty-full-web.pdf.
27. See Christin Ebrahimzadeh, Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth Managed Unwisely,
40 FIN. AND DEV. 1 (2003).
28. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
112-35 (2d ed. 2000); see also Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional
Evolution of International Human Rights, 19 HUM. RTs. Q. 705-08 (1997).
29. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 3, at 937.
30. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1-10 (1990); see also Louis Henkin, The Age of
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 2-6 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1999).
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sole province of states.3 1 Indeed, many states have developed a corpus of
workplace health and safety, environmental, labor, public nuisance, con-
sumer protection, anti-discrimination, and disclosure laws that imposes a
vicarious patchwork of human rights duties on corporations within their
jurisdiction. 32
Not surprisingly, the corporate human rights violations of greatest
concern occur in poor and developing states where regulatory capacity is
weak and heavily compromised by the "host state's unbalanced relation-
ships with [transnational corporations]. '' 33 Even when a developed coun-
try's laws wield extra-territorial jurisdiction-as most conspicuously
exemplified by the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 in the United States 34 -
corporate liability is usually left to the glacial advance of international law.
While "there is a clear basis in international law for extending interna-
tional legal obligations to companies in relation to human rights,"35 Kinley
and Tadaki concede:
The current scope of what might be loosely called the international human
rights law duties of TNCs is wide, but spread thinly and unevenly. It encom-
passes examples of supposed customary international law, treaty obliga-
tions, and so-called "soft law" codes of conduct, guidelines, and compacts.
The actual legal cover these initiatives provide is meager or non-existent.
31. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 3, at 937.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 938. Kinley and Tadaki go on to describe the infamous "race to the bot-
tom," in which states vie to attract desperately needed foreign corporate investment by
lowering their environmental and labor standards. Id. at n.12.
34. ATCA allows U.S. district courts to hear "any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
Despite its successes, ATCA suffers from a number of shortcomings, such as (1) ambigu-
ity and narrowness in the modern interpretation of "the law of nations"; (2) the limita-
tions of the "state action" requirement; (3) the difficulty of establishing personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants; (4) the doctrine of forum non conveniens, providing
judicial discretion to turn down a case that is deemed more appropriately tried in
another forum; and (5) separation of powers issues arising from judicial interference in
the Executive's authority over foreign relations. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 3, at
940-43. Other examples of extraterritoriality include the U.S. Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations statute and Torture Victim Protection Act, id. at 939, both of
much narrower scope, as well as Belgium's brief interlude with a "universal competence"
law that empowered courts to hear human rights cases by anyone, against anyone. Id. at
940. Along with the Belgian law, other recent attempts at domestic extraterritorial legis-
lation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia that specifically targeted
corporations' overseas conduct have fallen by the wayside. Id. at 939.
35. BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, supra note 3, at 165. Just as individuals, rebel groups, and
international institutions have all been found to bear an international legal personality,
there is no theoretical constraint on conferring international legal duties on corpora-
tions as well. Id. at 55-58. In some instances corporations already enjoy supranational
rights, including the right to privacy, a fair trial, and free expression. See Autronic AG v.
Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 178 (1990), 12 E.H.R.R. 485 '1 47 (1990). Moreo-
ver, the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that "every
individual and every organ of society . . . shall strive by teaching and education to pro-
mote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance . ... "
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (emphasis added).
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The legal (or quasi-legal) duties imposed on corporations have some poten-
tial authority, but as yet they remain ill-defined and ineffective. In short, the
rudiments of an international legal framework may be discernable, but the
legal content of the law is almost wholly absent. 36
As a result, corporations in the developing world operate within a legal
lacuna, leading to the kind of unchecked abuses described above.
Under pressure to be more accountable, many corporations have taken
up the banner of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), adopting various
voluntary initiatives, including those described above by Kinley and
Tadaki, as well as private codes of conduct, both internal and industry-
wide. 3 7 In doing so, businesses do not fill the role of government but
rather help promote human rights in their own sphere of competence. As
corporations like Unocal have learned the hard way, neglecting to act
responsibly can ultimately put their reputation and bottom line at risk.38
While this should be reason enough for corporations to care about human
rights, some corporations have nonetheless resisted specific and compul-
sory measures. 3 9 Many corporations continue to be magnanimous in their
charity towards society; however, it is exacdy this voluntary character of
philanthropy that corporations likely prefer, as it allows them to gain in
reputation without being bound to their commitments. This resistance to
compulsory measures has resulted in a variety of vague and unenforceable
multilateral initiatives, from the Global Compact to the U.N. Human Rights
Business Norms, 40 which are perceived, at best, as toothless paper tigers
and, at worst, as public relations "whitewashing."'4 1 In any case, corporate
human rights abuses persist. Ultimately, the ideal legal framework for
effectively guaranteeing corporate compliance with fundamental human
rights will be an integrated two-track regime, centered on the state's
responsibility to safeguard its own populace yet supplemented by interna-
tional mechanisms defining minimum standards applicable to a corpora-
tion's "sphere of influence" when the state is unwilling or unable to do
so.42 However, long before such international legal structures can be
36. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 3, at 948; see also Engstrom, supra note 4, at 50.
37. See Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, The Initiative Partners, http://
sparky.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/init-partners.html (listing supporters of the Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility Initiative, including Chevron Corporation, The Coca-Cola
Company, General Motors, etc.).
38. See American Petroleum Institute, Avila Beach: A New Beginning (2003), http://
www.api.org (search for "avila beach"); see also Press Release, Socially Responsible Com-
panies Rank High with Job Seekers, http://www.csrwire.com/PressRelease/php?id=6046,
Aug. 2, 2006.
39. Mary Robinson, The Business Case for Human Rights, in VISIONS OF ETHicA_ Busi-
NESS (1998).
40. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Subcomm. on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter "the Norms"]; see also U.N. Global Compact
website, http://unglobalcompact.org/.
41. See Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law, 37 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 287, 357 (2006).
42. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 3, at 993-1020.
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erected to fill the void, corporate human rights norms must mature beyond
their present thin and uneven infancy. While states are reluctant to share
the international legal stage and develop well-defined and compulsory
norms of corporate conduct,4 3 these norms may still emerge from the bot-
tom up.
44
Building on this strategic insight, this paper proposes using environ-
mental and sociai impact assessment (IA) 45 to transition from voluntary to
involuntary human rights compliance regimes. IA is a disclosure tool that
governments and corporations have long accepted, involving informational
and participatory components of informed decision-making, which we
consider fundamental. 46 While leaving the corporation's hands legally
untied and the basic international legal structures intact, IA guides the
market-based groundswell for corporate social responsibility towards sub-
stantive norms that will eventually emerge from the "bottom up" as inter-
national human rights law binding on corporations.
47
III. Building on Solid Rigging: Environmental and Social Impact
Assessment
This paper explores the history, significance, main principles, and
processes of IA. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) sprung from the
cross-fertilized fields of land use planning, cost/benefit analysis, multiple
objective analysis, modeling, and simulation. 4 8 The 1969 U.S. National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) heralded the first manifestation of a
national EIA regime and continues to be the primary implementing legisla-
tion in the United States, supplemented by a handful of similar state-level
enactments.4 9 Although such assessments had been previously contem-
plated, NEPA contributed to the systematic assessment and presentation of
environmental impacts, alternatives, and mitigation possibilities. The For-
eign Assistance Act of 1979 effectively extended NEPA's reach to U.S. for-
eign aid activities. 50 Since NEPA's inception, similar provisions have been
43. FleurJohns, The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation, 19 MELB. U. L. REV.
893, 900 (1994).
44. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 Am. Soc'v
INT'L L. PROC. 240, 242 (2000) ("Proponents of a liberal theory of international relations
identifly] multiple bodies of rules, norms and processes that contribute to international
order, beginning with voluntary codes of conduct adopted by individual and corporate
actors operating in transnational society and working up through transnational and
transgovernmental law to traditional public international law ....").
45. See CJ. BARROW, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 65 (1997).
46. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 19, 25, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
222 [hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights arts.
13, 23, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144; African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights arts. 9, 13, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 245.
47. See BARROW, supra note 45, at 172 (stating that corporations have already begun
to use their own impact assessment models).
48. Id. at 166.
49. Id. at 167 (discussing "little NEPAs" enacted by states).
50. Id at 170.
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widely adopted by many countries, often with considerable modifications
to the procedures and processes involved,5 ' the most robust transplants of
which are found in Australia,5 2 Canada,5 3 and the Netherlands. 54 Increas-
ingly, interest has turned global and focused on transboundary IA, such as
those dealing with climate change.55
In 1991, the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe launched the
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context, signed by 28 countries in Espoo, Finland.5 6 The Convention goes
beyond making provisions for a project-level IA to encourage program- and
policy-level assessments.5 7 Despite its successes, the Convention still
exemplifies a high-level, international IA tool based on local legislation that
is voluntary in nature and, therefore, difficult to enforce at the business
level. A further development in the recognition and use of IA comes from
the international financial institutions, many of which now require the
submission of impact statements prior to financing projects. 58 Stemming
from EIA, the World Bank, for example, has developed and propagated a
"Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)." 5 9 In contrast to EIA, which
is usually applied to site-specific projects, SEA is best suited to analyze poli-
cies, sectoral or regional strategic plans, and sub-regional investment pro-
grams. Since SEA focuses solely on the big picture, it cannot replace the
precision of a site-specific EIA. 60 In any case, these achievements of the
Espoo Convention and the World Bank provide an impetus and framework
for the adoption of the HRIA at the state level.
Another important form of IA is Social (and Cultural) Impact Assess-
ment (SIA). According to Burge and Vanclay, "social impacts include all
... consequences to a human population... that alter the ways in which
people live, work, play, relate to one another, organize to meet their needs
and generally cope as members of society," while "cultural impacts involve
51. Id.
52. See Australian Government Department of the Environment and Heritage, Refer-
rals, Assessments, and Approvals, http://www.deh.gov.au/epbc/assessmentsapprovals/
(2006).
53. See Kamta Prasad, Environmental Impact Assessment: An Analysis of the Canadian
Experience, 30 INT'L STUDIES 299 (1993).
54. See Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 853
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=70532.
55. BARROW, supra note 45, at 171; see also International Association for Impact
Assessment, http://www.iaia.org/.
56. See Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Con-
text, www.unece.org/env/eia/convratif.html.
57. BARROW, supra note 45, at 170-72.
58. See, e.g., Inter-American Development Bank, http://www.iadb.org/exr/pic/envi-
ronmental/environmental.cfm.
59. The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org.
60. MARIA TERESA SERRA, WHY/WHEN Do WE NEED SEA?, http://info.worldbank.org/
etools/docs/library/107861/sea/sea/materials.html (select "presentation script" link).
The differences between SEAs and EIAs revolve around three main issues: the timing of
decisions, the nature of decisions, and the level of information, all of which occur at
much higher levels of generality in the SEA. Maria Partidario, History, Trend, and Driv-
ers of SEA, available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/107861/sea/sea/
pdf/transcript/m 1partidario.pdf?33540.
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changes to the norms, values, and beliefs of individuals that guide and
rationalize their cognition of themselves and their society."' 6 1 SIA can
therefore be defined as "the study of the potential effects of natural physical
phenomena, activities of government and business, or of any succession of
events on specific groups of people."62 Focusing on the impact of business
on human society, yet mindful of the relevant governmental and environ-
mental interactions that may shape this impact, this paper will predomi-
nantly take SIA, and the principles and processes that animate it, as its
point of reference.
SIA was formalized with the passage of the NEPA, when it became evi-
dent that modifying a natural ecosystem also altered the culture and social
organization of contiguous and embedded human populations. 63 SIA
soon constituted an important part of EIA, carrying increasing weight
alongside economic and environmental considerations in the decision-
making process.6 4 Both SIA and EIA represent proactive and structured
approaches to gathering objective and comprehensive information about a
project or policy, including viable alternatives, in a way that involves the
public in the planning and decision-making process. For both IA types,
production of a clear, concise, and unbiased impact statement is the
means; sustainable development is the end. 65 Nonetheless, SIA remains on
historically uneven footing, typically subsumed within the relevant state
environmental policy framework.6 6 Yet, this need not be the case; SIA as a
freestanding process and methodology has the potential to contribute
greatly to the planning process of organizations and institutions across
many sectors, both governmental and non-governmental. 6 7
One of the most notable events in SIA history has been the agreement
upon and subsequent publication of the Guidelines and Principles for
Social Impact Assessment by the Interorganizational Committee on Guide-
lines and Principles for SIA.68 This publication is a milestone because it
represents a body of learned wisdom and established procedure that can
serve as a starting point for adaptation and adoption by land management
61. RabelJ. Burge & Frank Vanclay, Social Impact Assessment, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 31 (Frank Vanclay & Daniel A. Bronstein eds., 1995) (empha-
sis added).
62. C.P. Wolf, What is Social Impact Assessment?, in SocIL_ IMPACT ASSESSMENT 83-84
(1983) (emphasis added).
63. Burge & Vanclay, supra note 61, at 34.
64. Id. at 36.
65. BARROW, supra note 45.
66. See Burge & Vanclay, supra note 61, at 59.
67. Id. at 32.
68. See generally The Interorganizational Committee on Guidelines and Principles
for Social Impact Assessment, Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment
(1994) [hereinafter "Guidelines and Principles"] (formed to assist NEPA officials in car-
-cying out their mandate, the Interorganizational Committee includes representatives
from several government agencies, academic disciplines, and professional associations),
available at http://www.st.nmfs.gov/tm/spo/spo16.pdf; see also Jessica Glicken Turnley,
Social, Cultural, Economic Impacts: A Literature Review (Oct. 2002) (prepared for the
Environmental Protection Agency), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/
guidance/SlLitRevFinal.pdf.
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and regulatory agencies, as well as international aid organizations. 6 9 The
principles governing effective SIA, as generated by the Interorganizational
Committee, are mapped out in Figure 1. The principles emphasize the
involvement of all potentially affected stakeholders with a clear identifica-
tion of winners and losers and the vulnerability of under-represented
groups. 70 Furthermore, the assessment must be focused, dealing with the
issues and public concerns that "really count," not those that are just "easy
to count."7 1 The principles, operative definitions, methods, and assump-
tions applied in the SIA should be determined in advance and revisited
throughout the process. 72 Also, SIA demands reliable sources of data,
such as published social science literature and primary field studies, along
with the trained social scientists familiar with this information. 73 Feed-
back on expected social implications is essential, allowing project planners
to weigh the competing social costs and benefits of the proposed action
and its alternatives. 74 Finally, monitoring and mitigation programs help
manage uncertainty and minimize adverse effects as the project
proceeds. 75
The basic SIA process model, 76 grounded in that of the Interorganiza-
tional Committee, 7 7 is comparative and progresses in three consecutive
steps, as depicted in Figure 2.
Whereas EIA has offered one of the most far-ranging and significant
methodologies for improving projects and policies, there are few examples
where the use of SIA has made a significant difference. Successful integra-
tion of SIA into the institutionalized policy and decision-making process
will depend on a proven record of accomplishment. 78 However, SIA has
been difficult to apply because it is performed by outside experts serving
their employing organizations. In such circumstances, conflicts of interest
frequently emerge, dimming the comprehensive understanding and objec-
tive reporting of local community issues. 79 Critics of SIA also claim that it
is imprecise, overly theoretical, descriptive rather than explanatory, limited
to local application, and expensive.80 An additional criticism is that few of
the theories upon which it is based are clearly defined or reliable.,' The
response to these critics may prove instructive in the development of an
effective HRIA regime.
69. See Burge & Vanclay, supra note 61, at 31.
70. Guidelines and Principles, supra note 68, at 18.
71. Id. at 20.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 22, 24.
74. See id. at 21.
75. See Burge & Vanclay, supra note 61, at 57-60.
76. Id. at 38-39.
77. Guidelines and Principles, supra note 68, at 10-16.
78. See Burge & Vanclay, supra note 61, at 37-38.
79. Id.
80. BARROW, supra note 45, at 230; see also R.M. Muth, & R.G. Lee, Social Impact
Assessment in Natural Resource Decision-making: Toward the Structural Paradigm, 4 IMPACT
ASSESSMENT BULLETIN 168, 168-83 (1986).
81. BARROW, supra note 45, at 230.
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Figure 1: Principles Governing Social Impact Assessment
Source: Frank Vanclay and Daniel A. Bronstein (1995).
A final set of problems illustrates that such weaknesses may not be
unique to SIA. Currently, the greatest obstacles businesses face are the
time required to perform IA s 2 and the difficulty of finding sensible ways to
implement its recommendations. 8 3 IA needs better public participation,
improved circulation of information, and a firm legislative schedule. Also
cited as crucial to successful IA implementation are improvements in data,
planning, environmental management, participant integrity, and avenues
of appeal.8 4 Finally, political will and the ability to act on the resulting
recommendations are essential to the success of IA.
While EIA and SIA techniques are now considered mature, with repu-
table entities available to execute them, the temptation to cut corners to
save time and money is powerful. 85 This has raised concerns among envi-
ronmental groups. For example, some fear that the timeframe is too short
for a baseline environmental impact study for the proposed oil and gas
82. O'Neill, supra note 15.
83. See ALAN GILPIN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA) 158 (1995).
84. Id.
85. O'Neill, supra note 15.
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Figure 2: Social Impact Assessment Process Model
1 Assessment and Prediction Determination of the potential impact of a specific
action affecting a community before commencing any
change.
2 Mitigation and Monitoring Mitigation involves the initial statement about potential
negative consequences and how they may be averted,
as well as an ongoing role in the development process
by all parties in order to minimize negative impacts.
Monitoring is checking that any change that occurs
has been anticipated, and that appropriate mitigation
strategies are adopted to deal with unexpected conse-
quences.
3 Audit and Analysis Evaluating the methods and prediction techniques
underlying the SIA is crucial, as they vary greatly
across cultures. This also improves understanding of
the particular study area through the analysis of the
- social effects of past actions.
Source: Frank Vanclay and Daniel A. Bronstein (1995).
exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). 86 As a result,
a quick and superficial IA, possibly accompanied by a few token mitigation
measures, may be implemented in individual communities directly
affected, while the major structural issues-revenue, employment, boom-
towns, unintended migration-will not be addressed. These larger, "slow
burn" issues, now ignored, threaten to explode years into the future when
mitigation and remediation is all but impossible. 8 7
In developing countries, the appropriation of common resources by
individuals, special-interest groups, multinational corporations, or central
governments feeds the "slow burn," posing an increasingly common prob-
lem.8 8 In response, a socially oriented IA would alter this trajectory and
safeguard the traditional rights of local people. 8 9 It may also reduce the
uncertainty and social stress frequently attendant development projects,
building trust through communication and community involvement. 90
Therefore, the collective long-term economic benefits of sound environ-
mental and social IA, if successfully adopted, may greatly overshadow its
associated costs. Graham Smith argues that the social, economic, physical
and biological aspects of the environment are so interconnected that IA
should not treat them separately but should link them.9 1 In practice, such
a total social impact assessment is more of a goal than a reality, although
86. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND
DRAFT REGULATIONS: PROPOSED OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION WITHIN COASTAL PLAIN OF THE
ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE S-3 (1982).
87. O'Neill, supra note 15.
88. Id.
89. L. GRAHAM SMITH, IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
125 (1993).
90. A.L. Rydant, A Methodology for Successful Public Involvement, in SOCIAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 96-98 (1984); Burge & Vanclay, supra note 61, at 60.
91. SMITH, supra note 89, at 4.
Vol. 40
2007 Extracting Corporate Responsibility
support for it is growing. In this light, we consider a new breed of total
social impact assessment: the human rights impact assessment.
IV. In the Pipeline: A Human Rights Impact Assessment
Environmental and social impact assessments have been a keystone of
environmental and social protection in wealthy, developed countries.
9 2
Their success is due to their functional role in importing oft-neglected
information about the effects of a given project or policy into the decision-
making process without command-and-control regulation. Nonetheless,
because IA springs from the regulatory systems of the developed world, it
has a number of characteristics that limit its applicability to corporate-run
hydrocarbon projects in the under-regulated developing world. IA often
applies only to the activities of federal agencies or is territorially restricted
and not applicable to private corporations operating overseas. 93 Moreover,
as discussed above, IA fails to address the totality of potential conse-
quences, especially political, cultural, and economic rights. 94 While tradi-
tional state regulatory mechanisms compensate for this deficiency in the
developed world, their absence in places like Burma counsels for a more
effective and comprehensive regime.
A Human Rights Impact Assessment incorporates the human rights
rubric into the decision-making process attendant under-regulated opera-
tions of corporations in the developing world. It focuses on human rights
impacts occurring within a corporation's sphere of influence. The effects
may either contribute to or detract from the fulfillment and progressive
realization of international human rights standards. Unlike domestic regu-
lation, HRIA considers human rights "indivisible and interdependent" 9 5
and integrates positive and negative effects into a dynamic whole. Along-
side the increasing legal and normative authority of human rights stan-
dards, a growing body of scholarship and jurisprudence is bringing to bear
a more sophisticated and salutary understanding of their substance.
A. The Nuts and Bolts of HRIA
Despite its human rights frame of reference, an HRIA regime extends
many of the main principles and methodologies animating SIA. 96 Adapted
to address corporate impacts on human rights in the developing world, the
guiding principles should be:
1. Involve the Public: Identify all potentially affected and under-represented
stakeholders, especially workers and members of the local community.
This is especially difficult, but essential, when the state politically
marginalizes its minorities or lacks accountable, democratic governance.
92. Id. at 8-9.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
95. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July
12, 1993).
96. See supra Figure 1.
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In the latter case, a large-revenue hydrocarbon project calls for public con-
sultation throughout the country.
2. Analyze Impact Equity: Recognize and address the uneven distribution of
positive and negative effects. This is consonant with the spirit of non-
discrimination underlying all human rights. By minimizing the percep-
tion of preferrential treatment of particular ethnic groups or economic
clases, this also avoids communal strife.
3. Identify Relevant Definitions, Methods, and Assumptions in Advance (Set
Parameters): Reflect ahead of time on what constitutes significance,
reversibility, and mitigation potential, as well as the methods and under-
lying assumptions. This will concretize and legitimize the impact assess-
ment and promote transparency.
4. Internalize the HRIA in Decision-Making: It is understood that an HRIA,
and the critical insights derived from it (however unappealing to some),
should not be treated as a mere formality but rather as an integral source
of feedback informing the central decision-making process. Moreover,
the HRIA and its lessons should be institutionalized into corporate prac-
tice through internal codes of conduct and explicit policies addressing
discrimination, labor, security, and indigenous peoples that include
mechanisms for monitoring, non-retaliation, appeals, staff training, and
enforcement with contractors. 97
5. Use Competent HRIA Practitioners: HRIA auditors should exhibit indepen-
dence and familiarity in their dealings with the HRIA process and corpo-
rate decision makers. Financial and institutional independence is
imperative to avoid actual and perceived conflicts of interest. Familiarity
and faithful exception require employing and consulting with qualified
and cooperative social scientists and human rights practitioners.
6. Employ Data with Integrity: For reliable and current information, HRIA
auditors should use rigorous fieldwork along with credible sources of
data from published social science literature and human rights reports.
They should plan for data gaps wisely.
7. Transparency: Honestly disclose both the process and results of a project's
HRIA, to the extent consistent with the protection of vital trade secrets.
This strengthens the legitimacy of corporate decision-making and public
participation.9 8
These principles are necessarily intertwined. For example, sound
data collection and incorporating predictions of impact equity will rely on
active public participation and competent HRIA practitioners. Further-
more, this information will mean little if it is left out of corporate decision-
making, shorn of the relevant definitions, methods, and assumptions, or
confined to a closed dossier.
These principles guide the proposed HRIA process, as represented in
Figure 3 below, a process that is rooted in the work of the Interorganiza-
tional Committee on Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assess-
ment 99 and the Humanist Committee on Human Rights. 100
97. See Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 53-54 (2002),
available at http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/.
98. See id. at 24.
99. Guidelines and Principles, supra note 68, at 10-16.
100. The Humanist Committee on Human Rights is a Dutch organization, founded in
1981, with considerable influence on Dutch and European human rights issues, partly
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Figure 3: The Proposed HRIA Process
Step Description Applicable Principles
1. Preliminary Scoping-conduct a preliminary assess- Public Involvement; Parame-
Review: Scoping ment of what human rights implica- ter Setting; HRIA Internaliza-
and Screening tions, if any, are likely to arise. tion; Competent
Screening-assign HRIA coverage Practitioners; Data Integrity;
accordingly. Transparency
2. Baseline Assess- Determine the actual current human Public Involvement; Parame-
ment rights situation, from which the ter Setting; Competent Prac-
potential impacts can be predicted titioners; Data Integrity;
and actual effects can be gauged. 1 0 1  Transparency
3. Impact Projec- Predict potential impacts (and Public Involvement; Impact
tion responses), both positive and nega- Equity Analysis; Parameter
tive, and identify whether and how Setting; Competent Practi-
they are significant, reversible, and/or tioners; Data Integrity;
mitigable.,u 2  Transparency
4. Decision-making Use the above findings to formulate a Public Involvement; Impact
menu of alternatives and mitigation Equity Analysis; Parameter
measures; then consider all possible Setting; HRIA Internaliza-
options, weighing the positive and tion; Transparency
negative human rights impacts (and
their significance, reversibility, and
mitigability) and public input in the
final business decision.
Implementation Implement the best option, possibly the "no project option", along
with all associated mitigation and policy measures.
5. Post-Implementa- Monitoring and Mitigation - once the Public Involvement; Impact
tion: Ongoing Moni- project has been initiated, follow Equity Analysis; Parameter
toring, Mitigation, through with ongoing monitoring of Setting; HRIA Internaliza-
and Evaluation human rights consequences10 3 and tion; Competent Practition-
appropriate mitigation measures. ers; Data Integrity;
Evaluation - evaluate the performance Transparency
and parameters of the HRIA to refine
the model.
through its facilitation of a dialogue among experts. At a workshop in March 2004, they
devised the following steps to an HRIA: i) assessment of the actual human rights situa-
tion; ii) political analysis; iii) development of a view on the desired situation; iv) selec-
tion of essential questions; v) formulation of policy options and activities; vi) decision
on policy and activities; vii) monitoring; and viii) evaluation. Marike Radstaake & Jan
de Vries, "Reinvigorating Human Rights in the Barcelona Process": Using Human Rights
Impact Assessment to Enhance Mainstreaming of Human Rights 14-15 (March 2004)
(presented at the Fifth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Workshop
XIV), available at http://www.hom.nl/publicaties/Morocco-paper-and-bibliography.
pdf.
101. For a helpful approach for evaluating baseline conditions, see the Danish Insti-
tute for Human Rights' Human Rights Compliance Assessment [hereinafter "the
HRCA"]; M. Jungk, Building a Tool for Better Business Practice: The Human Rights Compli-
ance Assessment (2003).
102. These classifications, drawn from the IA tradition, are fairly intuitive and will
help organize decision-making according to relevant criteria. Nonetheless, their applica-
tion to human rights will require substantial clarification and harmonization. The
Hum in Rights Richter scale discussed in Embedding Human Rights, supra note 7, at 59,
offers a useful starting point for an analysis of significance.
103. The HRCA, supra note 101, a tool for assessing on-going human rights compli-
ance, is instructive in this respect as well.
Cornell International Law Journal
In summary, HRIA's directive to assess systematically and openly a
project's impact on human rights, to propose feasible alternatives, and to
consider feedback from the impacted communities will improve decision-
making by the corporation by assuring informed participation and empow-
ering stakeholders. Furthermore, by recognizing positive contributions
towards the fulfillment of human rights, the HRIA promotes and rewards
the beneficial effects of corporate activity. As a broader social innovation,
the HRIA will play a critical role in raising awareness about human rights,
identifying business practices and policies that further human rights and
sustainable economic development, translating general human rights
objectives into specific priorities and concrete measures, and illuminating
the causal links between specific economic activities or policies and
human rights. 10 4 Finally, through constant iteration, evaluation, and
adaptation, the HRIA will have a self-reflexive and evolutionary quality,
allowing it to improve through use.
Two closely related concepts fall conspicuously outside of the human
rights framework and will need to be assimilated by the HRIA to enhance
its effectiveness. The first of these deals with the right to a clean environ-
ment. Historically, environmental and human rights movements were per-
fect strangers. Even presently, policymakers and advocates rarely invoke a
human right to a healthy environment, which is subject to criticisms of
anthropocentrism. Nonetheless, the importance of environmental integrity
to the realization of fundamental human rights suggests that the HRIA can-
not forego this traditional EIA component.
The second proposed supplement to the HRIA framework addresses
the damage to development and good governance wrought by political cor-
ruption.10 5 Although freedom from bribery is not a recognized human
right, it is intimately linked to transparency and indispensable to the fulfill-
ment of all genres of human rights.10 6 As such, an HRIA needs to account
for the impact of business activities on corrupt practices, as this often falls
within the corporate sphere of influence. Integrating these indices of envi-
ronmental and corruption-related impacts, an HRIA offers a comprehen-
sive tool for improving corporate human rights compliance and decision-
making, which simultaneously reinforces and fortifies the human rights
system.
104. Radstaake & de Vries, supra note 100, at 13.
105. Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, 107 FOREIGN POL'Y 114, 114 (1997); see
also Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption - Causes and Conse-
quences, WORLD BANK, Apr. 1996; Mark Stevenson, U.N. Countries Reveal Costs of Cor-
ruption, ASSOCIATED PREss NEws WIRE, Dec. 10, 2003.
106. The intellectual seeds for a human right to be free from corruption are nonethe-
less being sown. See Nihal Jayawickrama, Corruption: A Violation of Human Rights?
(Transparency Int'l Working Paper, 1998), available at http://www.transparency.org/
working-papers/jayawickrama/ayawickrama.html; Ndiva Koefele-Kale, The Right to a
Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right, 34 INT'L LAWYER 1,
152-53 (2000).
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B. Underwriting HRIA: The Global Compact, U.N. Business Norms,
and Other Initiatives
Aside from these conceptual justifications, an HRIA regime benefits
from a number of other sources of legitimacy more familiar to the business
community. Realizing the many ways in which business profoundly affects
the dignity and well-being of individuals and communities, there is a grow-
ing commitment to establishing benchmarks, promoting best practices,
and adopting codes of conduct. As mentioned above, a variety of joint ini-
tiatives addressing human rights issues in the business context have
emerged, ranging from the two hortatory principles of the United Nations'
Global Compact to the more recent and portentous U.N. Norms for Busi-
ness. 10 7 While certainly not binding, these initiatives remain good-faith
promises by the business community and reflect the evolving expectations
of the international community. Furthermore, these initiatives, both
implicitly and explicitly, embrace the principles, processes, and human
rights rubric of the HRIA, and thus foreshadow its coming of age. In an
address to the World Economic Forum on January 31, 1999, U.N. Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan extended an invitation to business leaders to join
an international initiative, the Global Compact, which would bring compa-
nies together with U.N. agencies, governments, labor, and civil society to
support ten principles in the areas of human rights, labor, the environ-
ment, and anti-corruption. 10 8 Through policy dialogues, mutual learning
and engagement, and collective action, this initiative seeks to advance
responsible corporate citizenship so that business can be part of the solu-
tion to the challenges of globalization. 10 9 Despite nearly 2,000 companies
and other stakeholders operating in more than 70 countries, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that commitments to the Global Compact's Principles
are non-binding and, therefore, to be effective, they must rely on public
accountability, transparency, and the enlightened self-interest of
companies." 0
The first two principles of the Compact, which specifically refer to
human rights issues, proclaim that "[blusiness should support and respect
the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights" and that "busi-
ness should make sure it is not complicit in human rights abuses.""' The
first principle highlights key issues in the corporate sphere of influence,
such as compliance with local and international laws, addressing con-
sumer concerns, selecting appropriate business partners along the supply
chain, increasing worker productivity and retention, and building good
community relationships-all aimed at integrating human rights into cor-
107. UNITED NATIONS, THE GLOBAL COMPACT (2004), available at http://www.unglobal
compact.org/docs/about-the-gc/2.0. 1.pdf.
108. The Norms, supra note 40.
109. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on
Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in Davos, U.N.
Doc. SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999).
110. THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 107.
111. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/.
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porate policy and culture. 1 12
The second principle characterizes different forms of business com-
plicity (direct, beneficial, and silent) as they relate to various contemporary
issues, such as globalization, growth of civil society, transparency, and
accountability.113 Even though each principle is followed by implementa-
tion recommendations, 1 4 opponents find them inconsequential, even mis-
leading, because they lack proper enforcement mechanisms and are too
general to generate accountability. 51 5 Partly in response to these charges,
the Global Compact Office issued a new policy, Communication on Pro-
gress, which "asks participants to [report their] progress in implementing
the principles through their annual financial reports, sustainability
reports, other prominent public reports, websites and/or other communi-
cation channels on an annual basis." 116 When measuring and reporting
progress, companies are encouraged to use the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) indicators presented in Figure 4. Clearly, an HRIA is a necessary,
though not sufficient, element of satisfying the human rights commitments
of the Compact and its emergent reporting requirements.
The United Nations further incorporated human rights issues into
business practices when the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights adopted the United Nations Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises with Regard to Human Rights in August 2003.117 Also known as the
U.N. Human Rights Norms for Business, these guidelines are "soft laws"
that offer a comprehensive vision of a company's responsibilities. The
Norms provide more clarity and credibility than competing and vague vol-
untary codes. 1" 8 The Norms detail specific obligations vis-t-vis rights to
equal opportunity, non-discriminatory treatment, security of persons, and
112. Global Compact Principle One, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutThe
GC/TheTenPrinciples/principle 1 .html.
113. Global Compact Principle Two, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutThe
GC/TheTenPrinciples/principle2.html.
114. See id.; see also Global Compact Principle One, supra note 112.
115. Mahmood Monshipouri etal., Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global
Responsibility, 25 HuM. RTs. Q. 965, 980 (2003).
116. See Communication on Progress Overview, http://unglobalcompact.org/com-
municatingprogress (2003). In order to protect the integrity of the United Nations and
the GC, rigorous and transparent procedures were developed to communicate progress.
Participants failing to submit the mandated progress reports by June 30, 2005 have been
considered inactive until such submission is made (GC Integrity Measures). Global
Compact also actively consults with its members on how to enhance the quality of its
engagement mechanisms and ensure continuous quality improvement, integrity, and
accountability. Another independent initiative on promoting human rights in business
practices culminated on January 28, 2005 with the launching of world's first website
devoted to the topic of business and human rights. See Business & Human Rights the
Resource Centre, www.business-humanrights.org.
117. The Norms, supra note 40.
118. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE UN HumAN RIGHTS NORMS FOR BuSINESS: TOWARDS
LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc-pdf.
nsf/Index/OR420022004ENGLISH/$File/IOR4200204.pdf.
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Figure 4: Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Indicators for reporting the
progress on Global Compact's Human Rights (Principles 1 and 2)
Human Rights Relevant GRI Indicators
1. Businesses are asked to Description of policies, guidelines, corporate
support and respect the HR1 structure, and procedures to deal with all aspects
protection of international of human rights relevant to operations, including
human rights within monitoring mechanisms and results.
their sphere of influence; Evidence of consideration of human rights
HR2 impacts as part of investment and procurementdecisions, including selection of suppliers/con-
tractors.
Description of policies and procedures to evaluate
HR3 and address human rights performance within
the supply chain and contractors, including moni-
toring systems and results of monitoring.
Description of global policy and procedures/
HR4 programmes preventing all forms of discrimina-
tion in operations, including monitoring systems
and results of monitoring.
2. The are also asked to en- Evidence of considerations of human rights
sure that they are not com- HR impacts as a part of investment and procurement
plicit in human rights decisions, including selection of suppliers/con-
abuses. tractors.
Description of policies and procedures to evaluate
HR3 and address human rights performance withinthe supply chain and contractors, including moni-
toring systems and results of monitoring.
Source: About the GC; How to Participate, www.unglobalcompact.org.
labor. 1 19 In their implementing provisions, the Norms note that "transna-
tional corporations and other business enterprises shall conduct periodic
evaluations concerning the impact of their own activities on human rights"
among various other obligations to "disseminate and implement internal
rules of operation" and "periodically report on and take other measures"
with a view towards compliance with the Norms. 120 This language sug-
gests a central role for the HRIA in meeting evolving human rights
obligations.
While the Norms are still a long way from constituting a legally bind-
ing international instrument, or representing international customary law,
they have initiated a number of promising developments at the U.N. In
2004, the Norms proceeded to the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), who subsequently issued a report describing
existing initiatives related to business and human rights and identifying
any outstanding issues. 1 2  One of the recommendations put forward by
119. The Norms, supra note 40, 1I1 2-19 (further describing TNCs' obligations with
respect to national sovereignty, human rights, consumer protection and environmental
protection, followed by five general provisions of implementation).
120. Id. 1I 15-16.
121. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOCI, Subcomm. on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights, Report on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
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the High Commissioner states: "There is a significant need to develop
'tools' to assist businesses in implementing their responsibilities, in partic-
ular through the development of training materials and of methodologies
for undertaking human rights impact assessments of current and future
business activities.' 12 2 A month later, the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations with a man-
date to follow through on this recommendation. 123 In his recent interim
report to the 62nd Session of the Human Rights Commission, newly
appointed special representative John Ruggie acknowledged that "no ready-
made human rights impact assessment tools exist" but found that the
important task of developing one was beyond the resources and time con-
straints of his mandate. 124 This notwithstanding, in December 2005 the
Office of the High Commissioner, the Business Leaders Initiative on
Human Rights, and the United Nations Global Compact jointly released a
consultation draft of A Guide to Integrating Human Rights in Business Prac-
tice, which forcefully reiterated the need for a coherent HRIA frame-
work. 125  The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),
spearheaded by the U.K. Department for International Development
(DFID) and launched by U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair at the World Sum-
mit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September 2002,
ambitiously aims for increased transparency of cash flows between compa-
nies and governments. 126 EITI is based on the understanding that reve-
Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/91
(Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/UNin-
tlorgs/UNintergovernmentalorgs/UN/SubmissionstoUN-2004consultation-business
humanrights. Following a day of consultation with a wide range of actors, including
businesses, inter-governmental organizations, and NGOs, the report was submitted to
the Commission on Human Rights in February 2005.
122. Id. '1 52.
123. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/
L.87 (Apr. 15, 2005).
124. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Interim Report
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 11 35, 76, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006).
125. BUSINESS LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, A GUIDE FOR INTEGRATING HUMAN
RIGHTS INTO BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (2005), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/docs/issues -doc/human rights/guide hr.pdf. Consider the following subheadings
for the Guide's chapter on "Measuring impact and auditing: key steps for your business"
6.1 Set relevant performance indicators for measuring human rights impact
across the different functions of your business
6.2 Undertake human rights-based audits
6.3 Analyze the results of audits and use results to inform strategic development
of your business
Id. at 32.
126. U.K. Department for International Development, Launch of Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/eiti websitelaunch.asp
[hereinafter "Launch"]; Extractive Industries Transparencies Initiative, About EITI, http:/
/www.eitransparency.org/section/abouteiti [hereinafter "EITI"].
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nues from oil, gas, and mining companies should serve as a powerful
engine of growth in developing countries, sustaining livelihoods and allevi-
ating poverty.127 Unfortunately, a lack of accountability and transparency
almost certainly leads to corruption, conflict, and poverty. 128 With the
basic model of EITI established, "it now needs the political will and
resources to become universal." 129 The commitment "is shared with the
companies that extract resources, the countries that import them, and the
international institutions that lend to the developing world."' 130 Once
invigorated, this model will support the inclusion of a corruption compo-
nent in the HRIA, as well as underscore the principle of transparency con-
stitutive of the right to information.
Another promising initiative that expands the reach of human rights
commitments beyond the corporation itself is the International Financial
Corporation's Equator Principles.1 3 1 International financial institutions,
both public and private, play a crucial role in supporting extractive opera-
tions in developing countries through the loan approval process. Hydrocar-
bon projects have high up-front costs and are predominantly long-term
investments, so the decision to finance a proposal is a significant commit-
ment. Acknowledging this influence, in October 2002 the International
Finance Corporation convened ten major banks in London to draft the
Equator Principles, an industry-wide framework for addressing environ-
mental and social risks in project financing. 13 2 Presaging the HRIA, the
Equator Principles require developers to prepare assessments addressing
involuntary resettlement, the impact on indigenous peoples and communi-
ties, human health, pollution, and socioeconomic factors, and then fully
incorporate their results into project decisions by crafting management
plans. 133 The Equator Principles also contemplate mitigation, monitoring,
baseline studies, participation of affected parties (including indigenous
peoples and local NGOs, in the design, review and implementation of the
127. EITI, supra note 126.
128. Launch, supra note 126.
129. Press Release, Global Witness, EITI on the Right Track: Let's Go Further and
Faster, Mar. 16, 2005, available at http://www.globalwitness.org/press-releases/dis-
play2.php?id=280.
130. For example, the World Bank Group is extensively involved in this initiative. See
id.
131. See Aliens Arthur Robinson, The Equator Principles - Guidelines for Responsible
Project Financing, in FOCUS: PROJECT FINANCE (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.
equator-principles.com/documents/aararticle.pdf.
132. See Press Release, International Finance Corporation, Leading Banks Announce
Adoption of Equator Principle (June 4, 2003), available at http://ifcln001.worldbank.org/
ifcext/pressroom/ifcpressroom.nsf/pressrelease?openform&9BD14621E26623B78525
6D3AO071EOA4; see also Frequently Asked Questions about the Equator Principles,
http://www.equator-principles.com/faq.shtmi. On April 5, 2005, JPMorgan Chase
became "the third U.S. bank and the 30th financial institution globally to adopt the
Equator Principles." Press Release, The Equator Principles, JPMorgan Chase Adopts the
Equator Principles (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://www.equator-principles.com/
index.html.
133. See The "Equator Principles": A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining,
Assessing and Managing Social & Environmental Risk in Project Financing (Jul. 2006),
available at http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/EquatorPrinciples.pdf.
Cornell International Law Journal
project), and consideration of environmentally and socially preferable
alternatives. 13 4 As the Equator Principles gain momentum, increasing
pressure on corporations to perform an HRIA will be leveraged by one of
their most powerful stakeholders.
Other voluntary corporate human rights commitments underscore the
need and responsibility of corporations to carry out an HRIA, including
the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enter-
prises and Social Policy, the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work of the International Labor Organizations, and the Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises and the Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development. 13 5 Swept up in the rising tide of
expectations of corporate human rights compliance, such multilateral ini-
tiatives call for universal tools with international clout in order to refine
corporate decision-making.
C. The Business Case
"[S]uccessful companies are those that focus on responsibility rather
than power, on long-term success and societal reputation rather than pil-
ing short-term results one on top of the other."'136 Corporate human rights
responsibility may seem like a marked paradigm shift from traditional
shareholder duties and the fixation on bottom line, yet this need not be so.
There are two pragmatic justifications that resonate forcefully in the boar-
droom: reputation and long-term returns.
Our globalizing society is only beginning to appreciate the immense
potential for corporations to do both good and harm.137 The private sector
plays an indispensible role in fostering economic prosperity, development,
and technological progress, enabling the international community to real-
ize its ambitious sustainable development objectives, such as the Millen-
nium Development Goals. 138 On the other hand, the sensational abuses
134. Id.
135. Int'l Labor Org. [ILO], Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multina-
tional Enterprises and Social Policy, 204th Sess., 83 I.L.O. Official Bull. (2000), available
at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf; ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Document CIT/1998/
PR20A (June 1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/declarationweb.static_
jumpvar.pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT; The Organization for Economic Co-Opera-
tion and Development, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000), availa-
ble at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
136. Embedding Human Rights, supra note 7. See also Business Leaders' Initiative on
Human Rights, U.N. Global Compact, and Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, A Guide to Integrating Human Rights in Business Management (December
2005) for a persuasive presentation of the "business case."
137. The Norms, supra note 40, Preamble.
138. Potential development of HRIA would help to overcome the main weaknesses in
current approaches to CSR, as identified by -,he Chatham House Report: excessive of
CSR initiatives at the international level; a lack of clarity about how these initiatives
relate to each other; an excessive focus on getting businesses to make commitments to
CSR without follow-up assistance on implementing them; and finally, an absence of
credible monitoring and verification processes. See FANNY CALDER & MALAIKA
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and ravages of corporate activity have attracted the scrutiny of mass media,
human rights watchdogs, scholars, and international lawyers.1 39 Accom-
panying this global spotlight on corporations are new expectations of "cor-
porate citizenship," often articulated in the language of human rights,
which shape the depth and character of the corporate image. 140 While
corporations are not strangers to constructing and marketing an image in
order to boost consumer appeal and public approval, consumer and socie-
tal expectations that reach beyond the traditional concerns of product
quality and safety increasingly circumscribe this ability. For this reason,
corporations, particularly large TNCs sensitive to societal image, are look-
ing for the best way to incorporate human rights and social impacts into
policy and practice. 14 1 As such, voluntarily adopting regimes such as the
HRIA helps the pioneering corporation gain "a good name."'142 In fact, a
hand-in-hand assessment focused on the positive as well as the negative
will partly allay existing corporate concerns that the positive contribution
of TNCs would go largely unnoticed. Furthermore, those corporations that
foresee an inevitable drift of corporate responsibility into the international
human rights framework are not only able to capitalize on the market
appeal of ethical business leadership but are also likely to take part in, and
thus help shape, the identity and obligations of the good corporate citizen.
In addition to demand-side pressures, corporations have supply-side
incentives to be actively involved in an HRIA. One of the main business
motivations is accurately predicting the risks related to human rights,
which can often translate into unforeseen expenses, including kidnap-
pings, sabotage, civil war, and litigation. An HRIA helps corporations miti-
gate these risks and achieve sustainability over the long term.143 Extractive
industries inevitably make long-term investments and, left to geology's
whim, enjoy little choice in where to operate, making it very costly, if not
impossible, to withdraw from a troubled area. Similarly, maximizing the
positive impact of private sector operations on the host communities and
developing countries in which they operate may lead the corporation to
reap the unexpected rewards in business performance attendant a "good
human rights record": 144 increased labor productivity, community support
and participation, local consumer demand, stability and the rule of law,
and sustainable resource supplies. t 45 As former U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights Mary Robinson puts it:
CULVERWELL, FOLLOWING UP THE WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COMMIT-
MENTS ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 7 (Final Report, 2005), available at http://
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/sdp/CSRWSSDf.pdf.
139. See Debora L Spar, Creating Corporate Social Responsibility, BLUEPRINT MAGAZINE,
June 1, 2000, available at http://www.ppionline.org/ppi-ci.cfm?contentid=964&Knl -
gArealD=0.
140. See CALDER & CULVERWELL, supra note 138, at 50.
141. See Spar, supra note 139.
142. See Robinson, supra note 39.
143. See id.
144. Global Compact Principle One, supra note 112.
145. Id.
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[B]usiness needs human rights and human rights needs business ...
[W]ithout knowing the risks, and taking action to mitigate these risks in the
longer term, will it be sustainable? This is the essence of the "Business Case
for Human Rights": going beyond the question of businesses protecting their
reputation - while not ignoring the potential cost of a damaged reputation -
and looking at the other, both positive and negative reasons, for business
corporations to care about human rights. The challenge is to turn this com-
mitment into action, to respect and promote human rights.
1 4 6
V. Unocal Refined: A Human Rights Impact Assessment in Burma
"[M]y conclusion is that egregious human rights violations have occurred,
and are occurring now, in southern Burma. The most common are forced
relocation without compensation of families from land near/along the pipe-
line route; forced labor to work on infrastructure projects supporting the
pipeline (the SLORC calls this government service in lieu of payment of
taxes); and imprisonment and/or execution by the army of those opposing
such actions. Unocal, by seeming to have accepted SLORC's version of
events, appears at best naive and at worst a willing partner in the
situation. 147
The Burma case is the first monetary settlement arising from a claim
against a TNC for complicity in massive human rights violations within a
foreign regime. 1 4 8 With dozens of cases still pending in the federal
courts, 14 9 this precedent may have a significant impact on the outcomes of
those cases still on the docket. While the hydrocarbon sector boasts some
of the most formidable corporations in the world, the Burma settlement
has proven a nuisance to the industry. In addition to bad publicity and the
potential impact on shareholder equity, the settlement itself was costly.
Although the amount of the settlement is confidential, both sides have said
that the fifteen villagers from Burma have received hefty compensation.
1 50
The magnitude of the compensation became evident when Unocal sued its
insurance companies (which together insured Unocal for up to $60 million
in damages) to cover a portion of the case expenses.' 5 ' Unocal claimed
that "the allegations of forced labor, murder, rape, torture, battery, forced
relocation and detention throughout the Myanmar litigation fall within the
policies' 'personal injuries coverage." 1 5 2 Unocal sued its primary insurers
and re-insurers and was only reimbursed claims beyond an initial loss of
146. Robinson, supra note 39.
147. A letter excerpt from a Consultant to Unocal, 1995. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 1294, 1299-1300 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
148. Terry Collingsworth, Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Application
of the Alien Tort Claims Act to Violations of Fundamental Human Rights by Corporations,
37 U.S.F.L. REV. 563, 564 (2002).
149. See id. at 578-86.
150. Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to
Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 92 (2005).
151. Daphne Eviatar, A Big Win for Human Rights, THE NATION, May 9, 2005, available
at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050509/eviatar.
152. These were Unocal's words in the lawsuit against its insurance companies. Id.
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$15 million.' 53 The attorney fees alone are estimated at over $15
million. 154
This section (1) applies the proposed HRIA process [Figure 3] to the
Burma case and (2) explores how the HRIA process could have led to better
decisions and averted the tragic spectacle that befell both the local people
of Burma and Unocal itself.
In 1982, natural gas was discovered in what is now known as the
Yadana field.' 5 5 Unocal explored the area throughout the 1980s and
1990s, 15 6 a time of significant political unrest.15 7 In 1988, Burma's mili-
tary government murdered and imprisoned thousands of pro-democracy
protesters. 158 A new military regime took control shortly thereafter, calling
itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 159 and renam-
ing the country Myanmar. 160 Two years later the SLORC held elections
and the National League for Democracy, the primary opposition party,
won 82 percent of the parliamentary seats. 16 1 However, the SLORC
refused to relinquish power and murdered and imprisoned many of the
pro-democratic leaders. 162 In 1992, Unocal acquired the rights to the pro-
duction, transport, and sale of gas from the government's newly estab-
lished Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). 163 If it had been in
place, the HRIA process would have proceeded in the manner detailed
below.
A. Preliminary Review: Scoping and Screening
An HRIA in 1992 would have involved a preliminary assessment to
determine whether the pipeline project would potentially impact human
rights. Due to the volatile political situation, human rights violations could
have been expected in the absence of steps to protect the Burmese citizens.
In keeping with our proposed HRIA Principle 1 (Involve the Public), it
would have been essential to locate reliable local NGOs for reports and to
consult with international humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch to identify areas requiring further
consideration in the succeeding stages of the HRIA. Reflecting on Princi-
ple 3 (Identify Relevant Definitions, Methods, and Assumptions in
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Kenny Bruno &Jim Valette, Cheney & Halliburton: Where the Oil Is, 22 MULTINA-
TIONAL MONITOR 22 (2001).
156. Lisa Girion, Pipeline to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2003, at A32.
157. See U.S. Department of State, 2005 Investment Climate Statement - Burma, avail-
able at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/41990.htm.
158. See Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
159. See id. (stating that Burma's ruling military government has changed its name to
the State Peace and Development Council).
160. See id.
161. See Stephen Erlanger, Slim Chance Is Seen for Burmese Democracy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1991, at A15.
162. SLORC Coup in Burma (2006), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
war/slorc.htm.
163. Id.
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Advance), it would have become apparent that there were significant,
potential human rights violations that could result from the project. The
consulting company hired by Unocal to assess its investment risk in Burma
reported:
Throughout Burma the government habitually makes use of forced labour to
construct roads. In Karen and Mon states the army is forcing villagers to
move to more secure sites (similar to the "strategic hamlets" employed by the
U.S. army in Vietnam) in the hope of cutting off their links with the guerril-
las. There are [also] credible reports of military attacks on civilians in the
regions. 16
4
In the case of Burma, the Scoping and Screening step would have revealed
that the security component of the project would have significant human
rights implications. The security-related issues would have been easy to
discern in this case since the Government's military units were already
engaging in forced labor, forced relocation, and torture. For this reason,
the remainder of this case study focuses on human rights violations result-
ing from the security issue, though other human rights violations could
have been recognized during the Scoping and Screening step of a formal
HRIA.
B. Baseline Assessment
In the Baseline Assessment, it is essential first to determine the actual
current human rights situation and then to determine what risk factors
might result from a project. The Yadana Pipeline Project was proposed to
run east through Burma's rural Tenasserim region. 165 When determining
the current human rights situation in this area, it would have been appar-
ent that local populations opposed to the SLORC inhabited this area. U.S
State Department Reports on Human Rights Practices produced through-
out the 1990s noted that arbitrary arrest and detention of political dissent-
ers persisted. 166 The U.S. Department of State also reported that
[iun recent years, the Government has increasingly supplemented declining
investment with uncompensated people's "contributions," chiefly of forced
labor, to build or maintain irrigation, transportation, and tourism infra-
structure projects. The army continued to force citizens to work as porters,
which led to mistreatment, illness, and death. Citizens, including women
and children, were forced to labor under harsh working conditions on con-
struction projects throughout the country. 16 7
164. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
165. Id.
166. U.S. Department of State, Burma Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996
(1997), http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1996_hrp-report/burma.
html.
167. See id. The report continues: "The Government's statistics on these contribu-
tions and infrastructure projects suggest that the market value of these uncompensated
'contributions' has increased since 1992. According to the Prison Department exhibit in
the Defense Services Museum in Rangoon, the quantity of stone quarried by prisoners
increased more than fourfold between fiscal year 1988/89 and fiscal year 1994/95." Id.
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Both Unocal and the government wanted to protect the potential pipeline,
and the government agreed to provide security forces. Given the political
climate, it was clear that pipeline security provided by the Government's
military might threaten the safety of the local population. Since the project
required infrastructure in the Tenasserim region, applying this step would
have led to the conclusion that the security forces might force the citizens
to create that infrastructure, resulting in abuses and possibly torture.
C. Impact Projection
Applying Principle 2 (Analyze Impact Equity) would have revealed the
uneven distribution of positive and negative consequences resulting from
the project. Cognizant that the Burmese military was committing human
rights atrocities, an HRIA would have predicted that the pipeline security
provided by the military could result in forced labor, forced relocation, and
abuse. Military involvement could also hamper opportunities for small
businesses and a nascent labor market to emerge. Furthermore, the pipe-
line revenue would provide the SLORC with monies to purchase arms, ena-
bling them to oppress the population at large. While the potential revenue
from a large-scale project like this could provide great benefits to Burma, it
is very common for such military regimes to mismanage funds. An HRIA
would have recommended that Unocal require Burma to design a revenue
allocation mechanism with the assistance of experts to prevent misappro-
priation of the revenue (although, as is apparent in Chad, this is not neces-
sarily a foolproof solution). 168
Another possible recommendation might have been an alternative
security arrangement, which would have infused surplus capital into local
economies and encouraged the transfer of technological expertise. A Uno-
cal report issued in April 1994 after six trips by Unocal representatives
read: "Total and Unocal will insist upon western style construction prac-
tices including fair labor rates and the use of an internationally recognized
contractor."16 9 A fully integrated HRIA may have helped realize this
168. Although experience from the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project has not brought
about the desired result, the World Bank Group took unique steps to create a project that
would give Chad control of its own profits while maintaining accountability and foster-
ing opportunities for growth. Signs of corruption and mismanagement are already
apparent in Chad, but with modification this model could prove beneficial in future
projects. In the Chad case, all oil royalties are first placed in a transparent escrow
account from which various organizations receive loan repayments. The remaining prof-
its are subject to the newly created Oil Revenues Control and Monitoring Board (part of
the World Bank created Petroleum Revenue Management Law). This nine-member
Chadian committee is composed of various members of society and government and is
to allocate funds from the escrow account. The rules specify that 10% of the Chadian
money be set aside for future generations and that 5% go to the oil producing regions for
social development programs. 80% of the royalties are to be applied to education,
health, infrastructure, rural development, environment, water and other various social
projects. The remaining money is to be allocated to government operating costs. See
The World Bank Group, The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline: What is the Revenue Management
Program? (2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/ (select "Revenue
Management" link).
169. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1299.
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explicit policy.
For these recommendations to work, however, competent independent
HRIA auditors willing to engage corporate decision makers and the affected
communities (Principle 5) are necessary. This would result in the creation
of an essential and comprehensive human rights impact statement that
could be released to the decision makers, the host community, the stock-
holders, the host government, and human rights organizations (Principle
7, Transparency).
D. Decision-making
The results of the impact statement should be internalized during the
decision-making stage (Principal 4). An optimal project design must be
created at this stage with the project design team, taking into account not
only how the project or its alternatives can maximize their positive impact,
but also whether or not the project should continue. Potentially positive
effects must be protected in the project design. Potentially negative effects
must be addressed to determine how these effects can be reversed or miti-
gated and integrated into the final decision-making process. In Burma, the
HRIA would have projected a significant negative impact unless steps were
taken to mitigate the military's involvement with the project, ensure fair
compensation of displaced residents, and oversee resource revenue alloca-
tion by the government. The HRIA process could have entailed collaborat-
ing with external consulting firms such as Jane's Strategic Advisory
Services and Rand Policy Research to present alternative security measures
for the pipeline project. 170 Moreover an HRIA in Burma would have
engaged the local communities surrounding the proposed pipeline in a
series of translated interviews and detailed questionnaires to seek out their
concerns, evaluate their current living and political situation, and build a
trusting relationship with the local citizens. This would have ensured that
an effective and ongoing monitoring, mitigation, and evaluation process
could be implemented. Although the pipeline would have required some
relocation, the effects could have been minimized with an HRIA. It was
critical to engage local NGOs and experts in this process to design appro-
priate questions and ensure that the locals trusted those administering the
interviews and questionnaires. 17 1 In the case of Burma, the HRIA would
have demonstrated to Unocal that the cost of importing or training security
paled in comparison to the liability incurred from human rights violations.
170. For more information regarding these independent consulting corporations, see
Jane's Strategic Advisory Services, http://www2.janes.com/public/transnews-analysis.
html, and Rand Policy Research, http://www.rand.org/.
171. Although questionnaires were conducted in the Chad/Cameroon pipeline pro-
ject, the military that had committed recent atrocities accompanied the interviewers,
which scared the local population and interfered with an accurate assessment of the
situation. See Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, To Lend or Not to Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and
the World Bank's Internal Contradictions, 14 H~Auv. HUM. RTs. J. 197, 221 (2001).
Vol. 40
2007 Extracting Corporate Responsibility
E. Post-Implementation: Ongoing Monitoring, Mitigation, and
Evaluation
Had Unocal used an HRIA, the issues that were not addressed through
mitigation in stages 1 through 4 before the process commenced could have
been confronted during the Post-Implementation stage. In May 1995, a
U.S. State Department cable from the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, Burma
stated:
On the general issue of the close working relationship between Total/Unocal
and the Burmese Military, [Joel] Robinson [of Unocal] had no apologies to
make. He stated forthrightly that the companies have hired the Burmese
military to provide security for the Project and pay for this through the
Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). He said three truckloads of
soldiers accompany Project officials as they conduct survey work and visit
villages. 172
Documentation shows that Unocal was receiving on-the-ground reports but
did not address this information. 17 3 If HRIA Principle 6 (Employ Data
with Integrity) had been applied at this time, Unocal could have taken
steps to mitigate forced labor and various abuses in Burma. A State
Department cable dated May 20, 1996 reported that "[florced labor is cur-
rently being channeled, according to NGO reports, to service roads for the
pipeline to Thailand .... When foreigners come on daily helicopter trips to
inspect work sites, involuntary laborers are forced into the bush outside
camera range.' ' 174 With effective monitoring, these growing human rights
atrocities could have been detected and then reversed or mitigated. An
effective HRIA would have taken this documentation, disclosed the perti-
nent information, and recommended a course of action to curtail the
abuses.
On February 1, 1996, Total official Herve Chagnoux wrote to Unocal
that his recent answers to the press were not necessarily accurate:
By stating that I could not guarantee that the army is not using forced
labour, I certainly imply that they might, (and they might) but I am saying
that we do not have to monitor army's behaviour: we have our responsibili-
ties; they have their responsibilities; and we refuse to be pushed into assum-
ing more than what we can really guarantee. About forced labour used by
the troops assigned to provide security on our pipeline project, let us admit
between Unocal and Total that we might be in a grey zone. 175
172. Unocal Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
173. Id. ("InJune 1995 Amnesty International sent David Garcia, a Unocal employee,
a copy of its 1994 Human Rights Report on Burma. Attached was a personal cover note
addressed to Mr. Garcia which warns that there is a disturbing quote from Thein Oo Po
Saw, director of the Scientific and Technology Research Department of the Ministry of
Industry. His comment could mean that the government plans to use 'voluntary' labor
in conjunction with the pipeline. We know that from long experience with this regime
that what they call 'voluntary' labor is called forced labor in other parts of the world; and
forced labor not of convicts, but of ordinary citizens. Myanmar forced labor conditions
have been documented to be brutal and even deadly.").
174. Id. at 1302.
175. Id.
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Although there was documentation of some potential human rights viola-
tions in this case, it was neither well-organized, nor transparent, nor inte-
grated into the decision-making process. An HRIA would have provided
more information, structure, and transparency and would have prompted
the formulation of the mitigation measures and alternatives. Even if these
abuses would not have been anticipated in early stages of an HRIA, Unocal
could still have benefited from an HRIA during the Post-Implementation
stage, by addressing these human rights violations and effectively minimiz-
ing its liability.
Unocal divided the Yadana Pipeline Project into three phases, each
focusing exclusively on the commerciality of the gas. 176 While economic
considerations are certainly essential, the HRIA would have been able to
run parallel to the Unocal phases of development and been cost-efficient.
By following the HRIA process, the atrocities that occurred in Burma as a
result of the pipeline project could have been substantially reduced or elim-
inated. It could have even been argued that going forward was not worth
the challenges of redesigning the project in early stages, and that the best
alternative was to withdraw. Unocal's decision to ignore reports of massive
human rights violations proved expensive, unnecessary, and deadly. In the
end, the documentation that Unocal solicited but chose to disregard
proved to be essential evidence in the plaintiffs' case.
Conclusion
Traditionally, businesses view[ed] the social sector as a dumping ground for
spare cash, obsolete equipment, and tired executives.... [Today the private
sector tends] to approach the social sector not as an object of charity but as
an opportunity for... a partnership between private enterprise and public
interest that produces profitable and sustainable change for both sides. 17 7
Building on commitments to develop guidelines and initiatives that
place human rights on the business ledger, an HRIA has the potential to
enrich the decision-making process of hydrocarbon industries operating in
developing countries where they enjoy little or no regulatory guidance.
Despite the restricted focus of this paper on oil and gas projects, this
informed and participatory decision-making mechanism may prove useful
in any sector characterized by large potential human rights implications,
both positive and negative, such as mining, hydroelectric, infrastructure,
utilities, chemical, heavy manufacturing, and so on. While EIAs and SIAs
offer sound models to learn from, they lack the scope, integrated approach,
and international legitimacy of the human rights framework. Indeed, inter-
national law may soon confer upon corporations the rights and responsi-
bilities of international legal personality, rendering the development of a
human-rights-oriented impact assessment unavoidable.
176. Id. at 1297.
177. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, From Spare Change to Real Change: The Social Sector as
Beta Site for Business Innovation, 77 HARV. Bus. REV. 122, 124 (1999).
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In this article we propose a model HRLA that can be used to main-
stream human rights into corporate decision-making. Fundamentally, this
HRIA is grounded in seven important principles: Public Involvement;
Impact Equity Analysis; Parameter Setting; HRIA Internalization; Compe-
tent Practitioners; Data Integrity; and Transparency. These principles
color the whole HRIA process, from the Preliminary Review Scoping and
Screening, Baseline Assessment Impact Projection, and Decision-making
(on Implementation and Mitigation), through to the Post-Implementation
Monitoring, Mitigation, and Evaluation.
From the corporate point of view, embracing and addressing human
rights issues related to their operations is a matter of maintaining a sound
reputation and exercising sound business judgment. External expecta-
tions of good corporate citizenship call for the inclusion of human rights in
the corporate calculation. At the same time, long-term revenue considera-
tions require an analysis of the human risks that may burn slowly for
years, ultimately exploding years later in disaster, severe losses, and bad
publicity. The long-term social benefits attendant good corporate conduct
further incentivize business to consider its human rights footprint.
The additional outlays in time and money required by an HRIA are
among the main sources of resistance to be anticipated from the business
community. Indeed, the costs of an HRIA both in terms of extra invest-
ment and preparation time are likely to be significant. However, corpora-
tions already take years to finalize large-scale business decisions:
negotiating contracts, running in-depth economic analyses, and con-
ducting feasibility studies take time. Incorporating an HRIA into this pre-
liminary stage may not significantly strain the timeline. Furthermore,
when dealing with major investments such as a $1 billion pipeline, a
proper HRIA would be just a drop in the barrel. However significant the
expenses associated with an HRIA, as our case study has illustrated, corpo-
rations still focus too narrowly on short-term costs rather than on the long-
term benefits of sound decision-making.
It may be argued that corporations, if not properly regulated, will cut
corners on an HRIA by ignoring its implications or by choosing to mitigate
only the easiest problems while exaggerating positive effects. This not only
rewards the misbehaving corporation, but it simultaneously places the hon-
est companies, sincerely applying the HRIA, at a competitive disadvantage.
Yet, the transparent character of the HRIA and the existing high level of
public scrutiny from civil society largely moderate this problem. As long
as decision-makers fail to present a complete and comprehensive HRIA in a
public forum, stakeholders will have ample reason to suspect inaccuracy or
lack of transparency; as a result, the corporation will suffer, perhaps even
more than it would have had it chosen to forego the HRIA altogether. This
effect will preserve the reputation of the "honest" corporations and ensure
the integrity of the HRIA regime, slowly forcing more and more corpora-
tions to follow the fold, thereby diminishing the competitive disadvantage
of the HRIA.
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There are powerful arguments compelling businesses to embrace and
promote the HRIA, from following through on the commitments and expec-
tations of corporate social responsibility to promoting their own long-term
business success. At the same time, HRIA retains a corporation's freedom
of decision, making it a more palatable alternative than compulsory codes
of conduct. Indeed, the knowledge gained through an HRIA provides a
win-win situation for both corporations and the society that it affects.
Nonetheless, adopting the HRIA will help incorporate human rights into
corporate culture, reinforce human rights among local host populations
and global civil society, create an expanding body of sound project and
policy decision-making, support the development of human rights juris-
prudence, and ultimately pave the way for real corporate responsibility
under the aegis of international law. While the primary obligation to pro-
tect human rights will continue to rest on the state, the failure of the state
to act should no longer be an excuse for inaction on the part of a corpora-
tion whose power ought to require a greater level of responsibility.
The HRIA dovetails with progress made by others in the area of human
rights and corporate responsibility. After a two-year consultation process,
the Human Rights & Business Project of the Danish Institute for Human
Right recently launched its diagnostic Human Rights Compliance Assess-
ment (HRCA), which provides many of the operational details missing in
our HRIA framework. 178 Created by the Canadian Parliament, the Interna-
tional Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development is undertak-
ing a three-year human rights impact assessment project that "aims to
improve the capacity of civil society organisations to evaluate the impacts
of foreign direct investment on human rights."179 Similarly, Reinvigorating
Human Rights in the Barcelona Process: Using Human Rights Impact
Assessment to Enhance Mainstreaming of Human Rights proposes a paral-
lel HRIA framework to be integrated into European Union human rights
policy. 180 Focusing on Public International Financial Institutions (PIFIs),
a paper presented by the Working Group of the Halifax Initiative outlines a
way for corporate and PIFI processes to be practically entrenched in inter-
national human rights law.181 Drawing from this body of work, we sketch
178. See HRCA, supra note 101. The four-year research project to develop the Human
Rights Compliance Assessment was sponsored by the Danish Foreign Ministry
(DANIDA), the Confederation of Danish Industries (DI), and the Danish Industrializa-
tion Fund for Developing Countries (IFU). User's Guide to the HRCA Quick Check,
http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/pdf files/Introduction%20to%20HRCA%20
Quick%20Check.pdf. HRCA comprises "approximately 350 questions and more than
1,000 corresponding human rights indicators, developed from the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and over 80 other major human rights treaties and ILO conven-
tions." Human Rights Compliance Assessment, http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/
040_hrca.htm.
179. Rights & Democracy Initiative on Human Rights Impact Assessment, http://
www.dd-rd.ca/site/what we-do/index.php?subsection=projects&lang=EN&id=1489.
180. Radstaake & de Vries, supra note 100.
181. NGO Working Group on EDC, Risk, Responsibility and Human Rights: Taking a
Rights-based Approach to Trade and Project Finance (July 2004), available at http://www.
halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Final HR discussionpaper.pdf. The International Finance
Corporation is also funding the development of "an actual impact assessment guide."
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a broad strategy below.
* To support further integration of various initiatives into a standard
HRIA model, applicable across multiple sectors, through a collabo-
rative international body of government representatives, human
rights advocates, business leaders, labor groups, and civil society
such as the International Association of Impact Assessment, which
can delegate work to a taskforce of reputable specialists, we recom-
mended the following:
1. Creating a user-friendly HRIA forum and internet and print
accessible to both corporations and host communities, which
can provide a transparent database of completed HRIAs, along
with model HRIAs, matrices and techniques, best practices, and
other HRIA resources;
2. Assembling an independent and competent body of auditors,
and/or developing a professional auditor certification scheme, to
provide corporations with reliable and timely HRIAs. Here, it is
advisable to establish a centralized payment mechanism to
ensure the financial integrity of the process;
* To urge adoption of the HRIA at four levels:
1. At the corporate level, in voluntary internal and cross-sector cor-
porate codes such as urged by the GRI indicators of the Global
Compact human rights principles;
2. At the national level, as legislation placing the HRIA within the
domestic regulatory framework, and expanding any existing IA
framework to include human rights impacts overseas;
3. At the supranational level, as guidelines for the World Bank, IMF,
and other major institutions, such as advanced by the Equator
Principles; and
4. At the international level, as an agreement among states holding
corporations directly liable for their HRIA obligations in the
absence of domestic recourse; and
* To organize expert HRIA training teams for corporations and gov-
ernments wishing to adopt HRIA principles and procedures.
According to its authors the guide will review the entire spectrum of human
rights, focusing on the areas where the responsibilities of companies are clearest
but reminding companies that they should review all areas of rights relevant to
their operations. Human rights issues will be addressed at both country and
project levels. The country assessment will focus on what impact human rights
challenges can have on projects and vice versa. At the project level the guide will
take companies through a methodology that includes outlining each step of a
typical impact assessment, identifying what human rights considerations
should be taken into account at each step, and explaining the implications of a
human rights approach for the impact assessment process.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights: Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, 11 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006).

